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 1 
Calling  Law  a  “Profession”  Only  Confuses  Thinking  About  the  Challenges  Lawyers  Face1 
 




 Abstract:  It is appropriate to want lawyers to be mature, moral people 
and to help legal education reinforce those qualities.  It is also appropriate to be 
sure  students  understand  lawyers’  fiduciary  responsibilities  and  the  ways  lawyers  
fall short of meeting them.  It only confuses work on those issues, however, to call 
them part of teaching "professionalism."  Law is not a "profession" as that term 
has traditionally been used. Calling law a profession does not help understanding 




 I was invited to participate in this symposium, I believe, primarily because I have argued 
that  “law  is  not a profession  and  that’s  a  good  thing.”3 Professor Neil Hamilton of the St. 
Thomas faculty criticized my position4 and  I  expect  that  the  terms  “professional”  and  
“professionalism”  may  be  an  important  part  of  others’  papers.    I  predict  that  – at the end of the 
day – most of us will agree on many kinds of behavior we believe represent good lawyer 
conduct, but I think that how we reach and express our conclusions matters, both to us and to 
others we are trying to help think more clearly about their lives and careers.  I offer these 
                                                 
1Symposium  paper  for:  “What  is  the  Nature  of  the  Lawyer’s  Role  and  the  Implications  for  How  We  
Educate Lawyers?,” University of St. Thomas Law School, September 23, 2011.  
2Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law, The George Washington University Law 
School. 
3THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66-69 (2010).  See also, Thomas D. Morgan, 
Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 947 (2002). I have not been alone in 
asserting this position.  See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A  Dissenter’s  Commentary  on  the  Professionalism  Crusade, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008). 
4Neil Hamilton, The Profession and Professionalism Are Dead?: A Review of Thomas Morgan, The 
Vanishing American Lawyer (2010), 18 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, No. 2, p. 14 (2010).  See also, John M. 
Conley, Is Law Really a Profession?: Review of The Vanishing American Lawyer, by Thomas D. Morgan, 24 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1183 (2011). 
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remarks to further that conversation. 
 In  my  view,  “professionalism”  is  a  feel-good term, but a term without content.  We may 
think  we  can  recognize  good  professional  behavior  when  we  see  it,  but  the  terms  “professional”  
and  “professionalism”  tend to mean what a given speaker wants them to mean.  Too often, 
people who invoke professionalism use it to stop analysis rather than further it.  In short, 
professionalism tends to be a rallying cry, not a concept. 
 What I hope to do in this paper is look  at  several  ways  the  term  “professionalism”  has  
been defined and used.  I will suggest that professionalism best describes qualities of personal 
character, not occupational role.  I will acknowledge that persons who practice law are required 
to behave in ways associated with their role but I will suggest that calling those obligations 
“professional”  does  not  advance  understanding  or  behavior.    I  will  suggest  that  yet  other  uses  of  
the  terms  “professional”  and  “professionalism”  have  been  destructive  and  should be abandoned. 
I.    Sociologists’  Understanding  of  a  Profession 
 Sociology is a field that studies how human societies organize themselves.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that sociologists have had to address the concept of professions and professional 
work.5   The story sociologists have told about professions, in turn, has influenced how lawyers 
sometimes think about themselves.  Professor Hamilton summarizes the sociological account and 
its implications for law and lawyers very well when he says:  
“Since the late 1800s, the peer-review professions in the United States, including 
the legal profession, have gradually worked out stable social contracts with the public in 
both custom and law.  The public grants a profession autonomy to regulate itself through 
                                                 
5Leading analyses of professions include MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF 
EXPERT LABOR  (1988); ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC: ON THE PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE 
(2001); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 
(2nd ed. 2004).   
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peer  review,  expecting  the  profession’s  members  to  control  entry  into  and  continued  
membership in the profession, to set standards for how individual professionals perform 
their  work  so  that  it  serves  the  public  good  in  the  area  of  the  profession’s  responsibility 
and to foster the core values and ideals of the profession. 
 
“In  return,  each  member  of  the  profession  and  the  profession  as  a  whole  agree  to  
meet certain correlative duties to the public: to maintain high standards of minimum 
competence and ethical conduct, to serve the public purpose of the profession and to 
discipline those who fail to meet these standards; to promote the core values and ideals of 
the profession; and to restrain self-interest to some degree to serve the public purpose of 
the profession.    The  term  “professionalism”  *  *  *  captures  the  correlative  duties  of  the  
profession’s  social  contract  for  each  individual  professional.”6 
 
 Sociologist  Eliot  Friedson  goes  on  to  assert  that  professional  work  “is  so  specialized  as  to  
be inaccessible to those lacking the required training and experience, and [thus] * * * cannot be 
standardized,  rationalized  or  *  *  *  commodified.”7  The premise of both Professor Hamilton and 
Professor  Friedson’s  descriptions  of  the  legal  profession,  then,  is  that  law  and legal issues are 
largely impenetrable by non-lawyers and that responsibility for both has been entrusted to the 
legal profession.    
                                                 
6Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 4-5 (No. 4, 2008). In 
the  context  of  lawyers’  work,  sociologist  Eliot  Friedson,  a  member  of  the  ABA  Commission  on  Professionalism,  
defines  a  profession  as  “an  occupation  whose  members  have  special  privileges,  such  as  exclusive  licensing,  that  are  
justified by the following assumptions:  
 
(1) That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the use of complex judgments;  
 
(2) That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the service, they must trust those they 
consult;  
 
(3)  That  the  client’s  trust  presupposes  that  the  practitioner’s  self  interest  is  overbalanced  by  devotion  to  
serving  both  the  client’s  interest and the public good; and  
 
(4) That the occupation is self-regulating – that is, organized in such a way as to assure the public and the 
courts  that  its  members  are  competent,  do  not  violate  their  client’s  trust,  and  transcend  their  own  self-
interest.”   
 
ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF 
LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986).   
7ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC: ON THE PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE 17 (2001).  
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 In reality, the social contract story bears little or no relation to lawyers, either across 
American history or as we know them today.  Large parts of America began with no lawyers at 
all. 8  None came over on the Mayflower, and the first lawyer who arrived in Massachusetts was 
disbarred for jury tampering.9  Clergy acted as the judges in many of the colonies, and while the 
Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina colonies tolerated lawyer practice, they set such 
restrictive  limits  on  lawyers’  fees  that  few  could  make  a  living.10  While there were professional 
lawyers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, by the time of Andrew  Jackson’s  election  in  
1836, the situation had completely changed.  Professor Lawrence Friedman explains: 
“[W]ith  the  rise  of  Jeffersonian  and  Jacksonian  democracy,  the  leading  political  
party opposed the idea of government by experts. * * * [Thus,] it would have been 
surprising if a narrow, elitist [legal] profession grew up – a small exclusive guild.  No 
such profession developed.  There were tendencies in this direction during the colonial 
period; but after the Revolution the dam burst, and the number of lawyers * * * has never 
stopped growing.  In Massachusetts, in 1740, there were only about 15 lawyers (the 
population was about 150,000).  A century later, in 1840, there were 640 lawyers in the 
state – ten  times  as  many  in  ratio  to  the  population.”11 
 
 In fairness, Professor Hamilton dates the social contract with American lawyers as the 
“late  1800s,”  after  the  period  of  Jacksonian  influence.    In  effect,  however,  Professor  Hamilton  is  
thus conceding that the idea of law being a profession is largely a creation of the American Bar 
Association, founded in 1878.  The ABA used little professionalism rhetoric in its early years, 
                                                 
8JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 8 (1983). 
9Richard B. Morris, The Legal Profession in America on the Eve of the Revolution, in HARRY W. JONES, 
ED., POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL COMMUNITY 5 (1976).  See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW  94-97 (1985).  Professor Friedman importantly reminds readers, however, that each colony was 
different and generalizations about colonial experience are inevitably oversimplified.  Id. at 36-37, 98-99. 
10Richard B. Morris, The Legal Profession in America on the Eve of the Revolution, in HARRY W. JONES, 
ED., POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 4-11 (1976).  See also, Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of 
Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385, 1414-23 (2004). 
11LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 304 (2nd ed. 1985). 
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but wounded by criticism that lawyers largely existed to help large corporations evade the law,12 
people like Dean Wigmore seized  on  the  concept  of  law  as  a  “profession”  when  he  said  in  1915:   
*  *  *  “The  law  as  a  pursuit  is  not  a  trade.    It  is  a  profession.    It  ought  to  signify  for  
its followers a mental and moral setting apart from the multitude, – a priesthood of 
Justice. * * * 
 
“How  the  present  attitude  has  come  about  is  easy  to  see.    *  *  *  In  a  country  where  
all men started even and each man had to earn his living, – where tradition and privilege 
were cast aside, – * * * the law took its place with other livelihoods; and its gainful 
aspect became emphasized.  And then * * * came the commercial expansion following 
the Civil War; and the lawyer was more and more drawn into the intimate relations as 
adviser of the business man.  And now, in the large cities, the commercial standards have 
spread to the Law, and the profession has been merged into the trade. 
 
“Nevertheless,  that  is  all  an  error.    That  is,  the  inherent  nature  of  things  demands  
always  that  the  law  shall  be  a  profession.”13 
 
 During the 1920s, professionalism rhetoric was again largely laid aside, and it was not 
until 1936 that the ABA strenuously renewed its call for lawyer professionalism.  President 
Franklin  Roosevelt  had  backed  “Codes  of  Fair  Competition,”  prepared  by  tripartite  institutions  
of labor, management and government, but that arguably had little legal basis.  Many lawyers 
(and their corporate clients) were anxious about the New Deal, and sought to make the work of 
law and lawyers seen as independent of the work of political institutions.  Just two years earlier, 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone had argued: 
                                                 
12One  such  charge  was  heard  from  the  “bully  pulpit”  of  President  Theodore  Roosevelt  in  his  1905  Harvard  
commencement address. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, IV PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 407 (1910), as 
quoted in James M. Altman, Considering  the  A.B.A.’s  1908  Canons  of  Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2304 
(2003).    President  Roosevelt’s  charge  is  given  credence  in  Robert  W.  Gordon,  “The  Ideal  and  the  Actual  in  the  
Law”:  Fantasies  and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in GERARD W. GAWALT, ED., THE NEW HIGH 
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST–CIVIL WAR AMERICA (1984). 
13John H. Wigmore, Preface to ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION xxi (1915).  The year 
earlier, Louis Brandeis  had  published  his  own  important  book,  “BUSINESS A PROFESSION”  (1914),  that  called  upon  
business itself to place the public interest above profit.  See also, JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, THE AMERICAN LAWYER AS 
HE WAS – AS HE IS – AS HE CAN BE (1907).  
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 *  *  *  “[W]e  may  rightly  look  to  the  Bar  for  leadership  in  the  preservation  and  
development of American institutions.  Specially trained in the field of law and 
government, invested with the unique privileges of his office, experienced in the world of 
affairs, and versed in the problems of business organization and administration, to whom, 
if not to the lawyer, may we look for guidance in solving the problems of a sorely 
stricken  social  order?” 
 
“Throughout  the  history of Anglo-American civilization, the professional groups 
have been among the most significant of those non-governmental agencies which 
promote the public welfare.  Although in smaller measure, * * * their function has been 
not unlike that of the medieval guilds.  * * * While it has not inherited the completely 
independent status of the English bar, to no other group in this country has the state 
granted comparable privileges or permitted so much autonomy.  No other is so closely 
related to the state, and no other has traditionally exerted so powerful an influence on 
public  opinion  and  public  policy.”14 
 
 Giving authority to the new ABA House of Delegates that included state bar associations 
and other potentially-influential professional groups gave the ABA hope that it could help 
lawyers marshal public influence behind common positions.15  Among the first things the newly-
transformed American Bar Association aggressively – and successfully – opposed was President 
Roosevelt’s  court  packing  plan.16  Then, after World War II the ABA asserted political ideals 
favorable to loyalty oaths and other parts of the anti-Communist movement.17  
 It  was  in  that  context  that  Dean  Roscoe  Pound  in  1953  defined  “professionalism”  in  
terms that the ABA Commission on Professionalism picked up again in 1986 and that 
proponents of professionalism use today: 
                                                 
14Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1934).   
15EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 173-76.  
16See, e.g., ABA President Frederick H. Stinchfield, The Supreme Court Issue, 23 ABA J. 233 (1937). The 
same volume of the ABA Journal contains a discussion by a member of the House of Delegates about the need to 
increase lawyer income by reducing the number of new lawyers.  John Kirkland Clark, Limitation of Admission to 
the Bar, 23 ABA J. 48 (1937).  
17JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 231-259 
(1976). 
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 “The  term  refers  to  a  group  of  men  pursuing  a  learned  art  as  a  common  calling  in  
the spirit of a public service – no less a public service because it may incidentally be a 
means of livelihood.  Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the 
primary purpose.  Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is 
the  entire  purpose.”18  
 
II.  Abusive Uses of the Professionalism Ideal 
 What has bothered me most about the idea that professionalism requires ceding lawyers 
control  over  their  work  has  been  lawyers’  tendency  to  use  that  supposed  authority  to  pursue  their  
own political agendas and self-interest over the interests of justice and the public.  During the 
time  that  Dean  Pound  was  espousing  professionalism  and  decrying  “gaining  a  livelihood,”  in  at  
least equal measure, the ABA was concerned about the economic health of post-World War II 
lawyers.    An  ABA  publication,  “The  1958  Lawyer  and his  1938  Dollar,”  asserted  that  the  
average  lawyer  in  1954  earned  less  than  $7,382,  a  figure  said  to  be  less  than  “a  living  wage.”19 
To  change  their  economic  fortunes,  lawyers  were  urged  to  get  over  their  failure  “to  utilize  
techniques that smack of commercial  enterprise.”20  The key to lawyer economic success, the 
volume  went  on,  lay  in  increasing  the  lawyer’s  return  from  each  hour  worked.    The  concept  
sounds familiar to modern lawyers even if the numbers do not: 
“There  are  only  approximately  1300  fee-earning hours per year unless the lawyer 
works overtime.  Many of the 8 hours per day available for office work are consumed in 
personal, civic, bar, religious and political activities, general office administration and 
other non-renumerative matters * * * [so] chargeable time will average 5 hours per day 
[for  260  days  per  year].”21  
 
                                                 
18ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).  
19ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS ON LAW PRACTICE, THE 1958 LAWYER AND HIS 1938 DOLLAR 
9 (1958).  
20Id. at 6.  
21Id. at 10. 
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 Lawyers were urged to set a target income for themselves and divide it by 1300 to set 
their hourly rate.  Not all cases would support that rate, the authors noted, but in that case the 
lawyer  “must  secure  additional  business  and  increase  his  number  of  working  hours,  the  greater  
number  of  chargeable  hours  at  the  present  hourly  rate  giving  him  the  desired  gross.”22   
 Further,  lawyers  long  tried  to  restrict  clients’  ability  to  retain other lawyers who might 
take the clients away or who might represent clients challenging the status quo. Ultimately, in 
several cases, the Supreme Court has struck down professional standards embodying such 
ambitions.   
 In NAACP v. Button,23 for example, the state of Virginia had prohibited contact of 
potential  clients  by  agents  of  any  person  or  association  that  “employs,  retains  or  compensates”  
any  attorney  in  a  judicial  proceeding  in  which  the  person  or  organization  “is  not  a  party  and  in  
which it has no  pecuniary  right  or  liability.”24 As applied to the NAACP, the provision 
prohibited lawyers from cooperating with efforts to organize citizens to challenge racial 
segregation in the public schools.25  The  state  asserted  that  lawyers’  attempts  to  obtain  legal 
work are not speech protected by the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court brushed the 
argument  aside.    “[L]itigation  is  *  *  *  a  means  for  achieving  the  lawful  objectives  of  equality  of  
                                                 
22ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS ON LAW PRACTICE, THE 1958 LAWYER AND HIS 1938 DOLLAR 
10  (1958).  In  the  case  of  a  law  partnership,  the  report  observed,  “the  estimated  earning  power  of  the  younger  men  
should  include  an  anticipated  profit  to  be  realized  [by  the  partners]  from  their  services.”  Id.  at  14.   
23371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
24Code of Virginia §54-78 (1950). 
25Perhaps the Court found it relevant that the Virginia statute had been passed in 1956, just two years after 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), had created the legal rights that the NAACP sought to enforce.  
However, the Court expressly said that it would have reached the same result if the older ABA Canons of Ethics had 
been the source of the prohibition. 371 U.S. at 429 n. 11. 
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treatment * * * for the members of the Negro community in this country,”26 Justice Brennan 
wrote for the Court.  Whatever propriety the ABA Canons and Virginia Rules had as applied to 
lawyers  seeking  pecuniary  gain,  the  Court  said,  in  this  context  lawyers’  ethical  standards  did  not  
enjoy immunity from constitutional review.27 
 Even more significant in exposing the lawyers to the same regulations under which 
almost  everyone  else  works  was  the  Court’s  1975  decision  in  Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.28  
When Lewis Goldfarb tried to buy a house in Fairfax County, Virginia, he found that all the 
lawyers he consulted proposed to charge him exactly the same fee.  The legal issue became the 
validity of the minimum fee schedule recommended by the Fairfax County Bar Association, a 
voluntary bar, but one that was recognized by the Virginia State Bar, the group with disciplinary 
authority  over  the  state’s    lawyers.    Although  compliance  with  the  fee  schedule  was  said  not  to  
be  mandatory,  the  State  Bar  had  opined  that  a  lawyer’s  “habitual”  failure  to  comply  with  a  local  
                                                 
26371 U.S. at 429. 
27Id. at 439-43.  It seems clear that the Court understood what it was doing.  A vigorous dissent by Justices 
Harlan,  Clark  and  Stewart  reminded  the  majority  that  it  had  invaded  “the  domain  of  state regulatory power over the 
legal  profession.”  Id.  at  448-65.  Of course, Button was focused on a challenge to ethics rules that affected the 
vindication of civil rights, but the Supreme Court refused to so limit it when it decided Brotherhood of Railway 
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). the next year. There, the Union had made a list 
of lawyers whom it encouraged railway employees or their survivors to consult about job related deaths or injuries.  
These were ordinary damage  actions  from  which  lawyers  sought  “pecuniary  gain”  found  not  to  be  present  in  Button.  
Union members had traditionally been the victims of incompetent lawyers and aggressive claims adjusters, the 
Court  asserted.    The  union’s  program  was  not  “ambulance chasing”  and  the  union  was  not  itself  practicing  law;;  it  
was simply recommending that, before settling their cases, union members consult counsel whom the union had 
found to be competent.  Use of ethics standards to bar such recommendations was held to violate First Amendments 
rights of both free speech and free association. 377 U.S. at 5-6.  See also, United Mine Workers of America v. 
Illinois  State  Bar  Ass’n,  389  U.S.  217  (1967)  (gives  constitutional  protection  to  a  union’s  practice  of  employing  a  
salaried lawyer to represent members wanting to prosecute worker’s  compensation  claims  before  the  state’s  
Industrial Commission); United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) 
(Constitution requires a state to permit a union to recommend  lawyers  to  pursue  suits  under  the  Federal  Employers’  
Liability Act and to secure a commitment from those lawyers not to charge a fee in excess of 25% of the amount 
recovered).  
28421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
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fee schedules would  “raise  a  presumption”  that  the  lawyer  was  improperly  soliciting  cases.29   
 In  an  opinion  by  Chief  Justice  Burger,  who  later  became  a  critic  of  “commercialization”  
of  the  legal  profession,  the  Court  found  that  the  “voluntary”  fee  schedule  had  the  practical effect 
of fixing prices for legal services in Fairfax County.  More significantly for lawyers who thought 
themselves sheltered from outside regulation, the Court expressly rejected a contention that, as a 
“learned  profession,”  the  practice  of  law  is not subject to antitrust constraints, saying:   
“The  nature  of  an  occupation,  standing  alone,  does  not  provide  sanctuary  from  the  
Sherman Act, nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice controlling in 
determining whether § 1 includes professions. * * * Whatever else it may be, the 
examination of a land title is a service; the exchange of such a service for money is 
‘commerce’  in  the  most  common  usage  of  that  word.  It  is  no  disparagement  of  the  
practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that  it  has  this  business  aspect.”30 
 
 The combination of First Amendment and Sherman Act attacks made it inevitable that 
the idea that, as professionals, lawyers could look only inward for their regulation was gone 
forever.  The coup de grace was inflicted two years later in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.31  
Once again, the case involved the prohibition of solicitation.  This time, John Bates and Van 
O’Steen  had  opened  a  “legal  clinic”  in  Phoenix  and  had  published  a  newspaper  advertisement  
describing routine services they would perform such as uncontested divorces, adoptions, name 
changes,  and  simple  personal  bankruptcies  for  relatively  low  fees.    The  Court’s  response  to  
                                                 
29Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 170 (1971). 
30421 U.S. at 787-88.    The  Court  closed:    “In  holding  that  certain  anticompetitive  conduct  by  lawyers  is  
within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its 
professions.”  Id.  at  793.  However, that qualification has not reduced the significance of the decision.  Just three 
years later, when an engineering association tried to rely on this language to justify its ethical restraint on 
competitive bidding, the Court quickly brushed aside the special character of professions.  See National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States, 453 U.S. 679 (1978).  See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical 
Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (fee schedule for particular doctor services). 
31433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
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arguments that professionalism required prohibition of such advertising was withering:  
“We  recognize,  of  course,  and  commend  the  spirit  of  public  service  with  which  
the profession of law is practiced and to which it is dedicated. * * * But we find the 
postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be 
severely strained.  At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from 
themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the 
bar.  We suspect that few attorneys engage in such self-deception. * * * In fact, it has 
been suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise creates public disillusionment with 
the  profession.    The  absence  of  advertising  may  be  seen  to  reflect  the  profession’s  failure  
to  reach  out  and  serve  the  community.”32 
 
  My point in this section, then, is that lawyers have used professionalism rhetoric in the 
past to defend practices that outside observers could easily see served the interest of lawyers but 
not the interest of the public of the interest of justice.  That use of professionalism continues to 
this day.  Recently, in August 2011, the ABA House of Delegates again made my point when it 
invoked professionalism and professional standards to deny support for – and indeed condemn – 
a form of dispute resolution that is in use in several states.   
 “Collaborative  law”  is  an  effort  to  negotiate  resolutions  of  controversies  involving  people  
who recognize they will want to deal constructively with their present adversary in the future.  
Divorced spouses may have differences today, for example, but they may want to come out of 
the disputes better able to share child raising over time.  Likewise, a manufacturer and its 
principal supplier may dispute the quality of a particular shipment, but they may both want to 
strengthen their relationship rather than end it.   
 Even today, the ABA Model Rules would permit a single lawyer to try to represent both 
                                                 
32433 U.S. at 368-70.    “False,  deceptive,  or  misleading”  advertising  may  be  regulated,  and  “limited”  
disclaimers  may  be  required  as  to  lawyer’s  claims  about  themselves.    However,  “truthful  advertisement  concerning  
the availability and terms of  routine  legal  services,”  is  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.    Other  cases  upholding  
First Amendment protection of most lawyer advertising include In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Shapero v.  Kentucky  Bar  Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Peel v. 
Attorney  Registration  &  Disciplinary  Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990).  But see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 
U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding prohibition of targeted direct mail within 30 days of an accident or disaster).  
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clients in a good-faith effort to resolve their differences.33  If the negotiations broke down, that 
lawyer could not represent either client in later litigation.34  What collaborative law does is 
define a similar role for two lawyers, one representing each party but both explicitly trying to 
reach a settlement rather than a judicially-imposed result.  The National Commission on Uniform 
State Laws has worked out such a collaborative process that can be adopted as state legislation 
or rules of court.35  
 The response from the Section of Litigation was indignant opposition, centered around 
the concept of professionalism.  First, the idea that the ABA could acknowledge the power of 
states to adopt new legal processes and lawyer regulation was said to be contrary to the 
professional ideal that lawyers regulate themselves.  Never before, the opponents argued, had the 
ABA recognized a legislative power of lawyer regulation, and even though the NCUSL proposal 
took the form of proposed court rules as well, the ABA could not take the risk that a legislature 
might act instead.   
 Second, the proposal required that if a collaborative negotiation process failed, 
statements made during the negotiation should be deemed privileged.  Lawyers involved also 
were required to withdraw and turn the matter over to others for the litigation.  Never before, 
opponents argued, had the ABA required lawyer disqualification, ignoring of course that the 
current intermediation principle – indeed most of our conflict-of-interest regime – requires 
                                                 
33MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, Com. 28-33.  Prior to 2002, the substance of these Comments 
were found in Rule 2.2 (Intermediation). 
34MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, Com. 29.  See also, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 07-447 (Aug. 9, 2007). 
35Uniform Collaborative Law Act, adopted by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws in 2009, 
and amended in 2010 to respond to earlier ABA concerns. 
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exactly that.  Throughout the debate, the premise was that the greatness of our legal system is 
found in the clash of strong advocates, each assuming  the  other  lawyer’s  client  is  trying  to  take  
advantage of his or her own client.  Asking the ABA to abandon this ideal of professionalism at 
its best, the opponents successfully argued, would be more than lawyers should have to bear. 
 In telling this contemporary story, my point is not that collaborative law should be for 
every lawyer or every case.  Indeed, it may be that parties will find that the regime sounds better  
on  paper  than  it  works  in  reality.    My  point  is  simply  that  “professionalism”  was invoked this 
past summer in defense of preposterous claims.  The concept was invoked so as to stop analysis 
rather  than  assist  it.    My  purpose  in  opposing  “professionalism”  as  a  concept  or  a  category  of  
argument, then, is to try to limit the harm the term has caused and continues to cause today.  
III.    Others’  Efforts  to  Make  Sense  of  “Professionalism” 
 Seen in historical context, the American view of law as a profession is at most a little 
more than a century old and, more realistically, a project of the 1950s and 1980s.  Far from 
representing a social contract, the professionalism label has largely been applied by lawyers to 
themselves in an effort to achieve political influence and economic advancement.  
 Over the years, I have noticed that others whom I admire – including Professor Hamilton 
and others at this conference – have not always joined in my view of professionalism. They seem 
to  have  accepted  the  term  as  simply  part  of  the  lawyer  landscape,  or  they  have  tried  to  “redeem”  
the term by claiming that it supports their own view of how lawyers should behave.  
  What keeps the idea of professionalism alive and encourages calls for its restoration? In 
part, it is surely that professional status is flattering to many lawyers, and appeals in the name of 
professionalism are taken more seriously as a result.  But it is also true that many elements of 
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professionalism represent personal qualities or styles of behavior that appropriately appeal to 
lawyers’  aspirations  to  live  good  lives  and  act  in  ways  that  serve the public interest.  In this part 
of the paper, I will try to describe a few of those other views and explain why they have not 
persuaded me to change my mind. 
A.  Professionalism as Aspiration Higher than Rules 
 One recurring theme in professionalism debates is that Rules of Professional Conduct36 
represent reasonable floors, i.e., minimally-acceptable conduct, but professionalism calls lawyers 
to aspire to higher standards of behavior.37  That distinction might initially seem inspirational, 
but it largely misunderstands the multiple functions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
 A few rules are indeed floors. One function of the Model Rules is to identify when there 
is a basis for imposing sanctions, and to do that, some rules are expressed in terms of minimum 
standards.    Rule  1.1,  for  example,  requires  a  lawyer  to  act  with  “competence,”  i.e.,  to  avoid  legal  
malpractice, whereas most lawyers would aspire to excellence.  But even Rule 1.1 does more 
than set a low bar.  It defines four elements against which competence is to be judged – legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation – and it describes what a lawyer may and should 
do in an emergency when a client needs assistance that the lawyer does not really have the 
competence to provide.  
 Other Rules of Professional Conduct are much the same.  Rule 1.3 prohibits a lawyer 
                                                 
36As a practical matter, what I will be describing are the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, but 
because the only rules with legal effect are those adopted for use in a given jurisdiction, I will tend to use this more 
generic description. 
37In  “Professionalism  Defined,”  the  Florida  Bar quotes approvingly from an interview with Georgia Chief 
Justice  Harold  G.  Clark:  “Professionalism  differs  from  ethics  in  the  sense  that  ethics  is  a  minimum  standard  *  *  *  
while professionalism is a higher standard expected of all lawyers.  Professionalism imposes no official sanctions.  
It offers no reward.  Yet, sanctions and rewards exist unofficially.  Who faces a greater sanction than lost respect? 
Who  faces  a  greater  reward  than  the  satisfaction  of  doing  right  for  right’s  own  sake.”  See  http://www.floridabar.org.  
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from  acting  with  less  than  “reasonable  diligence  and  promptness”38 but then urges even greater 
attention  to  a  client’s  matters.39  Rule  1.5  prohibits  charging  an  “unreasonable”  fee,  but  then  
offers valuable guides as to what should go into setting a fee.40  These and other rules41 clearly 
do set floors, but each is couched in terms that encourage a lawyer to perform at a higher level 
and  none  require  use  of  the  term  “professionalism”  to  do  so.42   
 Many rules, however, are not floors at all; they give a lawyer some discretion how to act 
in situations where important values are in conflict.  Rule 1.6, for example, asserts the important 
principle that a lawyer must protect a client’s  confidential  information.    It  defines  confidential  
information broadly43 and then identifies specific exceptions where the protection of the client 
may give way to protection of others.44  Similar calls for exercise of reasonable judgment are 
found in Rule 1.14 on representing clients with diminished capacity45 and Rule 2.1 on giving a 
client  “candid  advice.”46 It is reasonable to disagree about whether the breadth of the underlying 
                                                 
38MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3. 
39Id. at Comment 3. 
40MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a). 
41See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (communication); R 1.13 (organization as client); R 
4.2 (communication with person represented by counsel). 
42Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking  “Professionalism,”  41  EMORY L. J. 403 (1992), 
argues that professionalism largely means delivering very good legal services.  I have no disagreement with the 
desire  to  do  that,  but  use  of  the  term  “professionalism”  does  little  to  advance  that  ideal. 
43MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). 
44Id. at R. 1.6(b). 
45MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.  1.14  (urging  the  lawyer  to  “as  far  as  reasonably possible, 
maintain a normal client-lawyer  relationship  with  the  client,  but  where  necessary  to  “take  reasonably  necessary  
protective  action”). 
46MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.  2.1  (reminding  the  lawyer  that  “advice  couched  in  narrow  legal  
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protection – or the focus of the exceptions – are properly defined, but it seems to me meaningless 
to  say  that  Rule  1.6  defines  a  “minimum”  standard  of  conduct  or  that  a  lawyer  behaving  
“professionally”  should  follow  different  standards. 
 I  have  spent  many  years  of  my  career  trying  to  “restate”  the  law  governing  lawyers  and 
writing and critiquing rules that regulate lawyer conduct.  I share the views of many in the field 
of legal ethics that we must try to articulate principles better and that situations can arise in 
which civil disobedience is the most appropriate course.  What does not follow, in my view, is 
that  terms  like  “professional  behavior”  or  “professionalism”  advance  the  effort  to  improve  
conduct.  
B.  Professionalism as Civility 
 When  many  advocates  speak  of  professionalism,  they  seem  to  have  in  mind  “civility,”  
which in turn comes down to moderating the intensely adversary spirit that many lawyers bring 
to  their  work.    The  Lawyer’s  Creed  of  Professionalism,  for  example,  says:     
“I  will  endeavor  to  achieve  my  client’s  lawful  objectives  in  business  transactions  
and in litigation as expeditiously and economically as possible.  * * *  I will advise my 
client that civility and courtesy are not to be equated with weakness. * * * I will 
cooperate with opposing counsel when scheduling changes are requested. * * * I will 
make every effort to agree with other counsel * * * on a voluntary exchange of 
information * * *. [And i]n civil matters, I will stipulate to facts as to which there is no 
genuine  dispute.”47 
 
 The smooth progression of litigation is important to the courts, and it is not surprising to 
see judges encouraging more voluntary cooperation and fewer matters for the court to decide.  I 
                                                                                                                                                             
terms may be of  little  value  *  *  *  especially  where  practical  considerations  *  *  *  are  predominant”). 
47The ABA House of Delegates in 1988 proposed this creed for use by state bar associations and their 
members, but made clear that its principles did not replace any part of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2011 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
675. 
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also share the view that there could be more nuance in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
that discuss how litigation is to be conducted, but the rules already mandate honesty in dealings 
with a court48 and third parties.49 They  say  a  lawyer  may  not  “embarrass”  or  “burden”  any  
person, even an opposing party.50  There is a practical limit to how many ways one can tell a 
lawyer who is a jerk how to behave as a mature adult.  
 Further,  it  is  not  obviously  preferable  that  lawyers  fail  to  protect  their  clients’  interests  if  
such protection might cause them to be less civil than others might wish.  Civility is a behavior 
whose very definition depend on context.  Much of the time, polite behavior is both desirable 
and  produces  results  that  will  be  in  a  client’s  long-run interest.51  Describing  “professionalism”  
as  a  synonym  for  “civility,”  however,  does  not  advance  the  analysis.     
 In trying to find an idea comparable to professionalism, one possibility might be 
“sportsmanship.”    It  seems  churlish  not  to  want  someone  to  be  a  good  sport,  but  does  the  term  
sportsmanship have any real content?  Is sportsmanship a quality of personal conduct and 
attitude that cuts across all sports, indeed possibly all of life?  Does sportsmanship take its 
content from context, e.g., the sport being played, or whether a game is being played for 
something more than exercise?  The more one considers such questions, the more 
“sportsmanship”  as  a  stand-alone concept does not constitute a guide to conduct.  I believe the 
same is true of professionalism. Neither concept gives effective guidance for lawyers trying to 
                                                 
48MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a). 
49MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1. 
50MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a). 
51On this subject, I would acknowledge the civility of Professor Neil Hamilton in showing me a draft of his 
review of my book in advance and in writing that review in a tone that reflects our long friendship.  I appreciate that 
civility and value that friendship and hope that the tone on this article reflects the same spirit. 
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behave appropriately.  
C.  Professionalism as Acting as a Check on Client Conduct 
 One can argue that preserving the rule of law is a special obligation of lawyers.  One can 
argue  as  well  that  a  lawyer’s  duty  to  see  that  his  or  her  clients  obey  the  law  is  as  great  as  the  duty  
to protect clients against abuses the legal system can impose.52  Arguably, some things are 
matters of law that should not be subject to partisanship or self-interest.53  In an address in 1910 
to the American Bar Association, for example, Woodrow Wilson said: 
“You are not a mere body of expert business advisers in the field of civil law, or a 
mere body of expert advocates for those who get entangled in the meshes of the criminal 
law.  You are servants of the public, of the state itself.  You are under bonds to serve the 
general interest, the integrity and enlightenment of law itself, in the advice you give 
individuals.”54  
 
 Professors  Robert  Gordon  and  William  Simon  have  tried  to  “redeem”  this  view  of  
professionalism in a way that fits their own ideals.  Each has argued that lawyers should 
maintain  a  critical  independence  from  their  clients’  values,  an  independence  facilitated  by  the  
sense that lawyers as professionals are inherently different from other kinds of advisers.55  
                                                 
52See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William H. 
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988). 
53See, e.g., PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO  85-92 (1998); SOL M. LINOWITZ 
WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4, 9-18 
(1994) (rule of law is diminished when lawyers see their role as to help clients get what they want rather than what 
they are entitled to); Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility, 19 Geo. 
J. Legal Ethics 155 (2006) (law schools have a duty to teach lawyers their role in preserving democratic 
institutions). 
54Quoted in ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS: A SURVEY OF 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DISCIPLINE AND DISBARMENT 57 (1952).  
55See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in ROBERT L. 
NELSON, DAVID M. TRUBEK & RAYMAN L. SOLOMON, EDS., LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (1992), at 230.  See also Robert W. Gordon, Corporate 
Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255 (1990); William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and 
Lawyers’  Ethics:  A  Critique  of  Some  Academic  Perspectives, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987 (2010). 
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 The problem with such a view, of course, is that lawyers cannot truly be independent of 
their clients.56  Quite apart from their status as fiduciaries who are legally required to pursue 
their  client’s  interests,  they  have  value  to  the  clients  only  as  they  serve  those  interests.    People  do  
not retain a lawyer to preserve the rule of law; they retain a lawyer for an instrumental reason, 
i.e., to get a useful service.  Indeed, lawyer creativity in helping business firms find ways to do 
things differently than they had previously tried has been arguably one of the things that has 
made economic development as dynamic as it has been.  
 What observers like to hope happened is that, in the process, lawyers also restrained 
excesses in which corporate officials would have engaged.  Some of that may have occurred.57  
Elihu Root is  quoted  as  saying,  for  example,  that  “half  of  what  a  lawyer  must  do  is  tell  his  client  
he  is  a  damn  fool.”58  It’s  a  wonderful  line;;  urging  clients  to  adhere  to  the  law  is  an  important  
part of the counseling that lawyers do.59  The problem is that there is no evidence that even 
Root’s  clients  took  his  advice.    Calling  moral  business  counsel  “professionalism”  may  do  little  
harm, but it is also unlikely to add much to realistic analysis of the actual advice a lawyer should 
convey. 
D.  Professionalism as Pro-Bono Service 
 Some of the most promising calls for professionalism are those for lawyers to engage in 
                                                 
56See, e.g., Stephen Pepper, Integrating Morality and Law in Legal Practice: A Reply to Professor Simon, 
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011 (2010).  
57There certainly was rhetoric to that effect at the time the ABA first prepared its Canons of Ethics in 1908.  
See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
241 (1992); Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’  Duty  to  Do  Justice:  A  New  Look  at  the  History  of  the  1908  Canons, 24 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1999).  
58ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 4 - 7 (1964).  
59MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1. 
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public service, including pro bono legal services.  Few would deny the value of pro bono service 
to poor clients and its role in establishing legal principles that assist people other than the clients 
themselves.  Given the fact that neither the ABA Model Rules nor the rules of any state require 
that lawyers engage in any pro bono service,60 one can argue that rule compliance does not 
capture this aspect of a  lawyer’s  behavior.     
 There is some evidence that large firm lawyers are doing more pro bono service than in 
earlier years,61 although whether the reason is that lawyers today simply have more time on their 
hands is open to speculation.  In any event, the personal instincts to subordinate self-interest and 
come to the aid of another unquestionably deserves applause.  The question is whether it adds 
anything  to  call  the  behavior  a  sign  of  “professionalism.”   
 Lawyers claim pro bono service as a common heritage, but Professor Richard Abel points 
out that even the most generous groups of lawyers typically contribute only about 1% of their 
collective time to such service.62  Particular lawyers who provide pro bono service deserve 
personal credit, but the fact they do so does not make lawyers part of a profession.   
 Voluntary legal aid societies around the country have delivered legal services to the poor 
                                                 
60MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 describes  pro  bono  service  as  a  lawyer’s  “professional  
responsibility”  but  then  says  only  that  a  lawyer  “should  aspire”  to  render  such  service.    The  voluntary  nature  of  pro  
bono services was not an oversight.  A proposal for mandatory pro bono service was so vigorously opposed in the 
ABA House of Delegates in 1983 that it put in danger the entire Model Rules project.  Then, when the ABA Ethics 
2000 Commission revisited the issue, full-time lawyers in legal services agencies opposed mandatory pro bono 
service,  arguing  that  they  did  not  want  to  spend  their  time  training  “amateurs.”  ABA  REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Rule 6.1 (2000).  
61See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357 (2010). 
62Richard L. Abel, The Paradox of Pro Bono Service, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2444 (2010). 
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since at least the founding of the New York society in 1876.63  Sadly, however, many programs 
of legal service for the poor have had as much to do with the interests of lawyers as the interests 
of  clients.    Concerns  about  meeting  the  legal  needs  of  “persons  of  moderate  means”  arose  at  the  
end of World War II as soldiers who had received free legal services while in the military came 
home and needed to buy houses, start businesses, and the like.  The expressed concern was about 
how  to  meet  their  needs.    “Lawyer  reference  plans”  (now  lawyer  referral  services)  were  one  
response; legal services offices were another.64  
 By 1951, the depression was a recent reality; lawyers had returned from World War II 
and pro bono services were justified as part of both the battle against communism, i.e., a way to 
show the poor that the rule of law was their friend,65 and an effort to see lawyers fully occupied 
in professional activity.66  The legal aid movement was funded heavily by what we would today 
call the United Way, not primarily by voluntary services of lawyers,67 and in the context of the 
time, the movement was primarily a way to give experience to law students and practical training 
                                                 
63See, e.g., EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); JOHN MACARTHUR 
MAGUIRE, THE LANCE OF JUSTICE: A SEMI-CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY 1876-1926 (1928); 
REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919). 
64Reginald Heber Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 416, 
417-24. 
65E.g.,  “It  is  a  fundamental tenet of Marxian Communism that law is a class weapon used by the rich to 
oppress the poor through the simple device of making justice too expensive. * * * Nothing rankles more in the 
human heart than a brooding sense of injustice.  Illness we can put up with; but injustice makes us want to pull 
things  down.”  Introduction  by  Reginald  Heber  Smith  to  EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A STUDY OF THE AVAILABILITY OF LAWYERS’ SERVICES FOR PERSONS UNABLE TO PAY FEES xiii (1951). 
66Legal clinics for the poor were also seen as a way to provide practical training for young lawyers who 
had gone into military service and now wanted to get experience before setting out on their own.  Returning lawyer 
veterans were denied the G.I. Bill because the government reasoned they were already trained.  Reginald Heber 
Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 416, 437-44.   
67ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES O. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 86 - 90 (1954).  
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to young lawyers who had gone into military service and wanted to brush up their skills before 
setting out on their own.68  Creation of the Legal Services Corporation, indeed, was in part a 
government response to a need that lawyers individually had refused to assume.69  However 
lawyers might like to claim the core value of furthering access to the legal system, then, their 
basis for doing so is doubtful. 
IV.  Professionalism as Qualities of Personal Character 
 Each of us tends to recognize good lawyer behavior when we see it.  My point in this 
symposium is simply that most of the behavior we admire is that of good people who only 
happen to be lawyers.  We would affirm the behavior whether or not a person was practicing 
law.   The issue whether lawyers engage in role-differentiated behavior has, of course, been 
with us for a long time.  Typically, the question put is whether a lawyer may do something that 
ordinary morality would prohibit.70  My own view is that there are relatively few occasions when 
persons who do the kinds of things lawyers do – receive confidential information from others, 
                                                 
68Reginald Heber Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 416, 
437-44. 
69The organized Bar was also concerned that if lawyers did not at least appear to assume such public 
responsibilities,  the  government  would  “socialize”  the  profession: 
 
“For  selfish  and  unselfish  reasons  we  hope  that  the  new  world  will  be  attracted  by  our  form  of  government  
and the American way of life so that, in other nations, free peoples will set up democratic regimes and 
institutions.  In order that our general system may make its maximum appeal, and because we are not 
hypocrites, we are engaged in reexamining our own institutions.  We want to keep what is good, and add 
what is found needed.  Law is the foundation of our whole structure.  We are determined that it shall be 
strong.  We know that law is not self-enforcing,  and  that  lawyers  are  essential.” 
 
Reginald Heber Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 416, 444.    
70The competing positions are helpfully addressed in, e.g., Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in 
Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980) 
 23 
for example – have moral responsibilities different than those of lawyers.71  The question 
sometimes posed today is whether lawyers have greater responsibilities than others in some 
situations, for example, a special duty to do justice and seek to free someone who has been 
improperly convicted.72  Once  again,  while  lawyers’  special  skills  may  make  them  best  suited to 
undertake such efforts, in my view anyone with the useful skills – a police officer, for example – 
similarly would have the moral obligation to use them.  
 Indeed,  I  believe  what  Professor  Hamilton  calls  “professionalism  clearly  defined”73 
ultimately can best be seen as such personal rather than professional characteristics.  Under his 
principles of professionalism, each good lawyer: 
“1.    Continues  to  grow  in  personal  conscience  over  his  or  her  career;; 
 
“2.    Agrees  to  comply  with  the  ethics  of  duty  – the minimum standards for the 
lawyer’s  professional  skills  and  ethical  conduct  set  by  the  Rules;; 
 
“3.    Strives  to  realize,  over  a  career,  the  ethics  of  aspiration  – the core values and 
ideals of the profession including internalizing the highest standards  for  the  lawyer’s  
professional skill and ethical conduct, 
 
“4.    Agrees  both  to  hold  other  lawyers  accountable  for  meeting  the  minimum  
standards set forth in the Rules and to encourage them to realize core values and ideals of 
the profession; and 
 
“5.    Agrees to act as a fiduciary where his or her self-interest is overbalanced by 
devotion  to  serving  the  client  and  the  public  good  in  the  profession’s  area  of  
responsibility: justice. 
                                                 
71One example might be whether a lawyer has a different responsibility than a doctor to reveal that a 
person the doctor has examined has a life-threatening condition, i.e., the problem presented by Spaulding v. 
Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).  Today, AMA Ethics Opinion 10.03 requires such disclosure; ABA 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits disclosure.  I do not believe the responsibilities should differ; both the doctor and 
lawyer  should  disclose  in  order  to  save  the  person’s  life. 
72A  prosecutor’s  duty  to  do  so  is  spelled  out  in  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) & 3.8(h).  
See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble [1]. 
73Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 4, 8 (No. 4, 2008).  
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“a.    Devotes  professional  time  to  serve  the  public  good,  particularly  by  
representing pro bono clients; and 
 
“b.  Undertakes  a  continuing  reflective  engagement,  over  a  career,  on  the  relative  
importance  of  income  and  wealth  in  light  of  the  other  principles  of  professionalism.”74 
 
 The  first  and  last  of  Professor  Hamilton’s  principles – growth in personal conscience and 
reflection  on  the  place  in  one’s  life  of  income  and  wealth  – clearly point to personal character.  I 
agree that both are critical parts of mature ethical living, and both are relevant whether one is a 
lawyer, a farmer or a government official.  The first of them is also the aspect of professionalism 
that Professor Hamilton has tested and found important to effective law practice.75   
 The second Hamilton principle, adherence to the standards that regulate lawyer conduct, I 
take as self-evident.  The same goes for adhering to required fiduciary standards.  Thus, it is the 
remaining four principles that require further consideration.  
 Professor Hamilton argues that ethical standards are not private.  That is, people exist in 
society and values are not ours to choose wholly privately.  We share a common humanity and 
learn ethical conduct from others.76  I agree.  Where I disagree is with the implication that the 
only or even best understanding of good lawyer behavior is provided by other lawyers.  One 
does require a law license to have important views as to the balance between confidentiality and 
third party interests, for example.  Such issues are not unique to lawyers, and we lawyers often 
                                                 
74Id. (internal footnotes deleted). 
75Professor Hamilton has been joined in the empirical work by Dr. Verna Monson.  See Neil Hamilton & 
Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of Professionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137 (2011); Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, Answering the Skeptics on Fostering Ethical 
Professional Formation (Professionalism), 20 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 3 (No. 4, 2011). 
76Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 4, 9-10 (No. 4, 2008).  
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have too much self interest wrapped up in the issues to think about them perceptively.77  
 My point is not that moral decision making comes naturally or that character education is 
unimportant.  Again, my point is simply that the proper resolution of moral issues facing lawyers 
should be  undertaken  on  their  own  merits.    Calling  issues  “professional”  and  looking  primarily  
to  lawyers’  views  about  the  issue  is  often  problematic  rather  than  helpful.  The  Conference  of  
Chief  Justices,  the  association  of  leaders  of  our  nation’s  state  courts,  were correct when they 
concluded:  
“Professionalism  ultimately  is  a  personal,  not  an  institutional  characteristic.  *  *  *    
The institutional framework of the legal profession can create a climate in which 
professionalism can flourish, but individual lawyers must be the ones to cultivate this 
characteristic  in  themselves.”78  
 
V.  The Changing World Facing the American Lawyer 
 Objecting to calling law a profession might seem a strange cause.  The professional label 
is a measure of status in which lawyers take pride, and if only status were at stake, challenging 
the label would not be worth the effort.  But more is involved.  Changes in the world current and 
future lawyers will face are almost inevitable.  The changes are likely to transform the way legal 
services  are  delivered  and  even  the  way  the  term  “lawyer”  has  been  understood.79  The changes 
will be matters of substance, not semantics.  They are likely to affect important ways in which 
                                                 
77Which conflicts of interest should be subject to consent and which not are similarly questions about 
which teaching from fellow professionals may be more misleading than helpful. 
78CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND 
PROFESSIONALISM (1999), quoted in Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 THE PROFESSIONAL 
LAWYER 7 (No. 4, 2008).  See also, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, 
Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL. 305 (2000); 
Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics & Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065 (2010); 
David Luban, How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel,  23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101(2010). 
79The changes make up a large part of THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (2010). 
See also, ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 
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lawyers understand who they are and the role they are likely to play in national life.  I will 
mention just three.  
A.  Globalization 
 Although trained in local law and licensed by state courts, American lawyers will not be 
able to ignore the effects of globalization on their practice.  First, globalization requires lawyers 
to know  the  legal  principles  that  allow  clients’  international  commerce  to  proceed.    Indeed,  a  
client engaged in e-commerce may do virtual business everywhere in the world simultaneously, 
and a lawyer who focuses only on what was once important will neither serve her clients well 
nor retain her clients long.  The day has come and gone when national borders – and a fortiori 
state borders – likely have any real significance in deciding how a transaction should be 
structured or a matter litigated. 
 American lawyers’  professional  standards  are  also  likely  to  be  affected  by  globalization  
as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) tends to break down barriers that today 
limit lawyers to practice in their home countries.  The day will come when French lawyers can 
open a practice in the United States just as the European Union permits French lawyers to 
practice in Germany.  When that happens, of course, it seems inevitable that a state such as 
California will have to also allow New York lawyers to open a practice in San Francisco.80  In 
that  kind  of  world,  talk  of  “professional”  standards  will  become  more  and  more  theoretical. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1930 TO THE PRESENT 283 (1996). 
80For additional information see, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, GATS’  Applicability  to  Transnational  Lawyering  
and its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 989 (2001); Laurel S. 
Terry, But What Will the WTO Disciplines Apply To?: Distinguishing Among Market Access, National Treatment 
and Article VI:4 Measures When Applying the GATS to Legal Services, 2003 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 83 
(Symposium Issue).  See also, Carol Silver, Winners and Losers in the Globalization of Legal Services: Situating 
the Market for Foreign Lawyers, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 897 (2005) (discussing the increase in programs at U.S. law 
schools for foreign lawyers, many of whom hope to practice with U.S. firms). 
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 These developments, in turn, will be magnified by changes occurring in lawyer 
regulation in other parts of the world.  British lawyers, for example, have recently experienced 
the most radical change in the regulation in their history.  As a result of the Legal Services Act of 
2007,81 the number of activities that only a lawyer may do has been reduced,82 a law firm may 
have non-lawyer investors,83 and the lawyer-client privilege extends to communications with 
people who are not lawyers.84  If American lawyers ignore the fact that their direct competitors 
play by different rules, they will have only themselves to blame when clients seek the same or 
better services at lower cost elsewhere. 
B.  Technology 
 Next, the increasing importance of information technology to law practice promises to 
transform tasks that used to be seen as complex, unique and worthy of substantial fees into 
simple, repetitive operations provided to clients by the lowest bidder.  Technology available on 
the simplest personal computer can instantly allow a lawyer to copy a document used in one 
transaction and change the names and terms for use in the next.  Knowing what changes are 
needed  to  fit  a  new  situation  will  always  be  a  big  part  of  the  professional’s  service,  but  the  
benefits of standardizing forms in transactions promises to be enormous.85  
                                                 
81Legal Services Act of 2007, 2007 Chapter 29. 
82Id. at § 12.  
83Legal Services Act of 2007, 2007 Chapter 29, Schedule 13.   
84Id. at § 190.  
85A rationale for wide use of boilerplate clauses is developed in Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033  (2006).    Ahdieh  notes:  “Contrary  to  the  rhetoric  sometimes  used  to  describe  
bargaining,  the  ultimate  goal  is  not  to  win  but  to  agree.”  Id.  at 1036.  Boilerplate reduces transaction costs without 
eliminating the possibility of seeking strategic advantage.  Depending on the standard clauses proposed, parties can 
seek  advantage  but  minimize  misunderstanding  because  the  boilerplate  terms  are  “focal points”  that  have  meanings  
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 The transformation of standardization from a shortcut to a virtue probably began in the 
real estate industry with the development of the standard form real estate contract. Similarly, the 
increased use of form wills and trusts can help assure that the drafter will not have forgotten 
important provisions necessary for desirable tax treatment.86  Form commercial documents can 
provide increased security that representations and warranties are standard for commercial 
transactions.  Even in litigation, form complaints can help assure that each element of a claim 
has been properly pled.87  The result of document standardization, of course, is that it is now an 
open secret that what lawyers do is no longer always a complex task requiring expertise worthy 
of premium pay.  Much of what lawyers do is what most merchants do, i.e., sell commodities 
that ultimately command only a price set in competition with many potential sellers.88  
 Another technology-based  reality  that  will  transform  lawyers’  practice  is  the  world  of  
free information that lawyers have traditionally sold, but that is now available on the Internet.  
Books about law have been around for years, but technology now makes the information 
                                                                                                                                                             
parties know from prior experience.  Indeed, in bargaining, even small departures from boilerplate terms can make 
agreement  more  difficult  as  the  “changes  raise  the  question,  ‘Why?’”  Id.  at  1046. 
86There are a number of web sites that offer legal documents, some with additional services and some 
without.  See, e.g., legalzoom.com, uslegalforms.com, legaldocs.com, and lawdepot.com.  
87The key books in this area are RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1996), and RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE LAW (2000). 
88It would be a mistake, of course, to assume that globalization will occur equally rapidly in every line of 
commerce.  High-touch personal services are likely to continue to be delivered locally.  Part of the challenge in 
considering the impact of globalization on lawyers, then, will lie in distinguishing which lawyer roles are more like 
the making of machine parts and which require a local touch.  Thomas Friedman says: 
 
“[N]o  matter what your profession – doctor, lawyer, architect, accountant – if you are an American, you 
better be good at the touchy-feely service stuff, because anything that can be digitized can be outsourced to 
either the smartest or the cheapest producer, or both.” 
 
 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13-14 (2005). Mr. 
Friedman also reports that it is likely over a half-million tax returns brought to CPAs in the United States are now 
outsourced to India.  
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ubiquitous.  It is often provided free at websites ranging from Wikipedia to specialized blogs, 
and the effect is to render a great deal of formerly exotic legal information broadly accessible.  
Prepared by thousands of authors, these alternative information sources threaten the monopoly 
on which lawyers have depended for a steady client base.89  Clearly, lawyers will tend to be able 
to assimilate and apply information from these sources more quickly and accurately than clients 
can,  but  the  breakthrough  is  that  a  lawyer’s  knowledge  is  no  longer  a  black  box  incapable  of  
client penetration.90  Whether free or for a charge, ubiquitous help from information services 
increasingly will be available to individuals planning their own affairs, drafting their own 
documents, and even appearing pro se in litigation, just as software helps millions of former 
accounting clients prepare their own tax returns.91    
 
C.  The Diminished Significance of Licensing 
                                                 
89See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABORATION 
CHANGES EVERYTHING 11  (2006)  (“credentialed  knowledge  producers  share  the  stage  with  ‘amateur’  creators  who  
are  disrupting  every  activity  they  touch”)  ;;  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE 
KNOWLEDGE 156-160 (2006). 
90Management  consultant  Tom  Peters  quotes  Michael  Lewis  as  saying:  “Parents,  bosses,  stockbrokers,  
even military leaders are starting to lose the authority they once had. ... There are all these roles that are premised on 
access  to  privileged  information.    What  we  are  witnessing  is  a  collapse  of  that  advantage,  prestige  and  authority.”    
TOM PETERS, REIMAGINE!: BUSINESS EXCELLENCE IN A DISRUPTIVE AGE 67 (2003). 
91Technological breakthroughs are not new to the  legal  profession.    “Automation  and  technological  change  
posed dangers to lawyers, just as they posed dangers to other occupations.  Social invention constantly threatened to 
displace them.  It was adapt or die.  For example, lawyers in the first half of the [19th] century had a good thing 
going in title searches and related work.  After the Civil War, title companies and trust companies proved to be 
efficient competitors.  By 1900, well-organized, efficient companies nibbled away at other staples of the practice, 
too: debt collection and estate work, for example.  Nevertheless the lawyers prospered.  The truth was that the 
profession was exceedingly nimble at finding new kinds of work and new ways to do it.  Its nimbleness was no 
doubt due to the character of the bar: open-ended, unrestricted, uninhibited, attractive to sharp, ambitious men.  In 
so amorphous a profession, lawyers drifted in and out; many went into business or politics because they could not 
earn a living at their trade.  Others reached out for a new form of practice.  At any rate, the profession did not shrink 
to  (or  rise  to)  the  status  of  a  small,  exclusive  elite.”    LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 634 
(2nd ed. 1985).  
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 A third change in the world American lawyers face is the declining significance of being 
licensed before providing legal services.  A traditional, useful working definition of the practice 
of law has been that it  consists  of  applying  the  general  body  of  law  to  a  specific  client’s  question  
or problem.92  One might think that definition will makes the boundaries of law practice 
sufficiently clear that the idea of being a lawyer will remain constant.  But as we have seen, 
changes ranging from globalization to the way clients get information foreshadow changes in 
what it will mean to be a lawyer.  Prohibitions of the unauthorized practice of law are likely to 
have very little effect in protecting American lawyers against these changes.93  
 Lawyers themselves are breaking down traditional unauthorized practice barriers as they 
assist clients, not only in the states in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, but in other states 
or nations where the client has legal needs.94  It used to be an open secret that many lawyers 
regularly violated unauthorized practice rules by taking depositions, negotiating contracts and 
even giving legal advice in states where they were not licensed.  Then, the California Supreme 
                                                 
92This definition was used in ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 3–5 (1970).  
A law professor does not practice law when teaching, for example, because he or she teaches the law as it relates to 
hypothetical, not real, clients.  Similarly, one who writes a book about law in not thereby engaged in law practice.  
93Bar associations have set up unauthorized practice of law committees whose responsibility has been to 
seek injunctions against those providing services that lawyers believed they alone were entitled to provide.  
Increasingly, the effectiveness of those efforts also has been reduced.  When the State Bar of Texas tried to enjoin 
sale of a CD-ROM called Quicken Family Lawyer, the state legislature responded within a month with a statute 
declaring such sales to be legal.  Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc., 179 F.3d 
956 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacating injunction based on the new statute).  The public did not find theories of 
professionalism and the social contract to be effective arguments against letting technology help them avoid using 
lawyers.  And after an earlier unauthorized practice of law case, State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title and 
Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961), the state of Arizona even amended its constitution to assure real estate brokers 
the right to fill in the blanks on a real estate sales contract. Ariz. Const., Art. 26, § 1. 
94See, e.g., Demetrios Dimitriou, Legal Ethics in the Future: What Relevance?, in GARY A. MUNNEKE, ED., 
SEIZE THE FUTURE: FORECASTING AND INFLUENCING THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000).  
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Court struck  terror  into  lawyers’  hearts  with  its  Birbrower decision95 that denied lawyers the 
right to collect a fee for such work.  States responded with changes in their rules to approve at 
least  “temporary”  work  in  states  where  a  lawyer  is  unlicensed,96 and lawyers continue to push to 
expand the boundaries within which they may practice. 
 More important, lawyers and law firms have long used paralegal personnel, nominally 
working under the lawyer supervision that ethical standards require, to help them deliver legal 
services. Corporate legal offices are similarly in a position to use non-lawyers to provide 
services they need done.  Negotiating contracts, troubleshooting discrimination claims, even 
preparing court documents can all be done by non-lawyers within an organization receiving a 
level of lawyer supervision and training to which unauthorized practice rules cannot effectively 
speak.97   
 Often, the non-lawyers will benefit from lawyer assistance, and current legal ethics rules 
require a lawyer in a private law firm to supervise and take responsibility for the non-lawyer’s  
work,98 but within a corporation or other organization client, lawyer supervision need only be 
provided if it is cost-effective to do so.99  
                                                 
95Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1988).  
96MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5. 
97Professor  Herbert  Kritzer  calls  such  persons  “law  workers”  and  sees  them  as  examples  of the kinds of 
people  with  whom  lawyers  are  likely  to  compete  in  the  future.    See  Herbert  M.  Kritzer,  The  Future  Role  of  “Law  
Workers”:  Rethinking  the  Forms  of  Legal  Practice  and  the  Scope  of  Legal  Education,  44  ARIZ. L. REV. 917 (2002).  
See also, HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS & ORDINARY LITIGATION (1990); HERBERT M. 
KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions 
Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3 (1999).  
98MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3. 
99See, e.g., Susan Hackett, Inside Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in the In-House 
Profession, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 616 (2002) (compliance programs in areas such as environmental, human 
resources, tax, marketing/antitrust, health/safety, are often under the direction of non-lawyer compliance officers 
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VI.  Implications of this Discussion for Legal Education 
 Looking back at non-self-serving efforts in the name of professionalism, one must 
acknowledge  that  often  more  was  involved  than  hollow  phrases.    Efforts  to  improve  the  law’s  
fairness, to eliminate invidious discrimination, and to enhance opportunities for all citizens have 
occupied  the  public  careers  of  many  of  the  nation’s  finest  lawyers,  often  at  real  personal  cost  to  
themselves.  We all benefit from the uniform laws, simplified procedures, and important reforms 
that lawyers have to show for their work.  There is no reason such work should end; indeed, legal 
educators should hope to encourage their graduates to do more of it.   
 But I believe such good works by lawyers were the product of good people who did some 
of their work using legal skills.  In my view, professionalism as an ideal is nebulous and largely 
irrelevant to the issues lawyers face.  In my view, professionalism in the sense asserted by the 
ABA during the 19th and 20th centuries – and by Professor Hamilton and others today – should 
be seen as dead.   
 The implication of my argument for legal education is that I join Professor Hamilton in 
saying that there is an important place for moral formation in education generally and legal 
education in particular.  I would offer two additional reasons, however, for not making that effort 
part  of  a  broader  proposal  for  “professionalism”  education.     
 First, in times of change and uncertainty for lawyers, one of the first places the ABA 
looks to cast blame and propose reform is the law schools.  I represent the AALS in the ABA 
                                                                                                                                                             
who have access to lawyers but do not necessarily report to them).  But see Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in 
an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1163-75 (1997) (assuming a 
more proactive role for corporate counsel in developing compliance programs). 
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House of Delegates,100 and I have met more than a few delegates who would like to exercise 
authority over law school admissions, curriculum, faculty hiring, and the like.  The ABA Section 
on Legal Education has released proposals for increasing professionalism education in U.S. law 
schools.101  About  the  time  law  schools  agree  to  take  on  the  task  of  forming  “professional”  
identity, I can virtually guarantee that the ABA House of Delegates will determine that it is the 
final arbiter of the substance of what will be taught.   
 It is no criticism of the delegates personally to say that most have no experience teaching 
law, and even less background in the field of professional formation.  Even if I disagree with 
Professor Hamilton on occasion, his efforts to prepare better people and better lawyers have been 
informed and subject to reasoned discussion.  Having educational content prescribed by the ABA 
Standing Committee on Professionalism,102 the ABA Section on Legal Education103 – and 
certainly the ABA House of Delegates104 – however, is not a promising prospect. 
                                                 
100Nothing in this article necessarily represents the view of the AALS officers or Executive Committee. 
101July 2011 p roposed ABA Accreditation Standard 302(b)(4)(ii) would require that an accredited law 
school’s  graduates  demonstrate  “knowledge,  understanding  and  appreciation  of  ...  the  legal  profession’s  values  of  
justice, fairness,  candor,  honesty,  integrity,  professionalism,  respect  for  diversity  and  respect  for  the  rule  of  law.” 
102See, e.g., Ronald C. Minkoff, Reviving a Tradition of Service: Redefining Lawyer Professionalism in 
the 21st Century, 19 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (No. 4, 2009).  
103See, e.g., Amy Timmer & John Berry, The  ABA’s  Excellent  and  Inevitable  Journey  to  Incorporating  
Professionalism in Law School Accreditation Standards, 20 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (No. 1, 2010), citing 
Donald J. Polden, Statement of Principles of Accreditation and Fundamental Goals of a Sound Program of Legal 
Education, 40 SYLLABUS (ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC.) 2 (Spring 2009). Ethical and professional education is one 
of the few substantive requirements to survive in the proposed ABA Standards for the Accreditation of Law 
Schools.  The vehicle for ABA action is thus ready to be set in motion.  
104At the August 2011ABA Annual Meeting, the House of Delegates overwhelmingly adopted Resolution 
10B, proposed by the New York State Bar Association on the eve of the meeting with no prior warning.  It places 
the ABA on record in favor of all law schools devoting additional resources to making graduates practice ready and 
the accompanying report purports to tell law schools how to do it.  No serious weight was given by the House to the 
concern of the ABA Section on Legal Education & Admission to the Bar that it had not had time to evaluate or 
estimate the costs involved in implementing such a requirement. 
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 Second, I would discourage making formation of professional identity a law school 
objective because of the important data coming out about placement of U.S. law graduates.  Last 
year, about 1/3 of U.S. law graduates were required to take jobs that did not require bar passage, 
i.e., they are apparently not practicing law at all.  Legend has it that entering law students were 
once  told,  “Look  to  your  right;;  look  to  your  left.    One of you will fail your courses and not be 
here  next  year.”  Today,  most  law  schools  wait  to  make  that  speech  until  graduation;;  few  of  our  
students fail their course work but many fail to become professional lawyers. 
 I believe that is likely to remain true for a significant number of graduates for a number 
of years into the future, and the important question for our students will be what we teach that 
will be of lasting value no matter how they use their education.  We need to be sure that law 
students have good information about what their chances of particular kinds of employment are, 
but it may actually be liberating for law schools and their students not to be limited to making all 
students  “practice  ready.”  In  the  kind  of  world  our  graduates  face,  lawyers – like all citizens – 
will have a moral obligation to devote their best efforts to using their skills in ways that 
contribute to the public interest, whatever form their own employment may take.105  The goal of 
our law schools should be to help make our  graduates’  productive  human  beings,  not  just  more  
“professional”  lawyers. 
                                                 
105Deborah Rhode has called on lawyers to become leaders and for law schools to help them become so. 
E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers and Leadership, 20 THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 1 (No. 3, 2010); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Where is the Leadership in Moral Leadership?, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 4 (Deborah L. Rhode, ed., 2006).  The call updates some of the message of 
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).  The suggestion is 
appropriate and perhaps now even more plausible. 
